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An Overview of Sex Discrimination in
Amateur Athletics
by JEFFREY K. RIFFER*
I
Introduction
Amateur athletic rules which discriminate on the basis of
sex have primarily occurred in four major areas: (1) females
who have been excluded from the male team, both when there
was or was not a comparable female team; (2) males who have
been excluded from the female team when there was no com-
parable male team; (3) disparate rules of the sport depending
on whether the participants were male or female; and (4) dif-
ferent seasons for male and female teams in the same sport.
Not surprisingly, athletes who have been adversely affected by
these rules have challenged them under the federal Constitu-
tion's equal protection clause,' state constitutions, 2 Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972,3 and miscellaneous state
statutory provisions.4 This article reviews the relevant consti-
tutional and statutory provisions and then analyzes and criti-
cizes the recent decisions in these four identified areas of sex
discrimination in amateur athletics.
* B.S., Indiana University, 1975; J.D., Indiana University, 1978; Attorney, Kadison,
Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi; Adjunct Professor of Sports Law, Pepperdine
University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 1; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28; WASH. CONST. art. 1,
§ 12.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
4. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 340.379(2) (West 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:276 (West Supp. 1976).
COMM/ENT L. J.
II
Synopsis of Relevant Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions
A. Federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause
The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall .. .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."5 This clause has been interpreted to mean that
gender-based discrimination must serve important govern-
mental objectives and the discriminatory means must be sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'
B. State Constitutions
State constitutional provisions which mandate equal protec-
tion of the laws and equal rights7 have provided support for
athletes challenging amateur eligibility rules which precluded
members of one sex from participation in athletic events. Sev-
eral courts have held that rules precluding girls from compet-




Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, enacted on
June 23, 1972, 9 states:
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Of course, if a "state" does not deprive one of
equal protection of the laws, this amendment does not apply. See, e.g., McDonald v.
New Palestine Youth Baseball League, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (a private
baseball league can prohibit a girl from playing on a boys' "hardball" team even when
the only female team available to her only plays "softball").
6. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3334-36 (1982) (a
state supported university cannot limit its enrollment to women); Caban v. Moham-
med, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (a state cannot permit an unwed mother and not an unwed
father to block adoption).
7. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 1; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28; WASH. CONST. art. 1,
§ 12.
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa.
Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
9. This statute was adopted in conference without formal hearings or a commit-
tee report. Some legislative history is given in Comment, Title IX's Promise of Equality
of Opportunity in Athletics: Does It Cover the Bases?, 64 Ky. L.J. 432, 450-53 (1975).
Sports were only mentioned twice in the congressional debate. See Note, Sex Discrim-
ination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle On Title IX, 88 YALE L.J.
1254, 1255 n.1l (1979).
Title IX's power rests on Congress' spending power. Congress can attach conditions
[Vol. 6
No. 3] SEX DISCRIMINATION IN AMATEUR ATHLETICS 623
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance [except for nine
stated exceptions]. 1°
Although this statute does not explicitly provide for a private
cause of action, the Supreme Court, in Cannon v. University of
Chicago," held that a woman's allegations that she was denied
admission to medical schools at two private universities on the
basis of her sex stated a claim for relief since Congress im-
pliedly authorized a private cause of action. The Court also
held that a plaintiff does not have to exhaust administrative
remedies prior to initiating a suit.12
However, even after Cannon, one court did not allow a pri-
vate cause of action for damages when a woman sued a private
school claiming she was denied admission to its medical school
because of sex discrimination; the court concluded that plain-
tiff's remedy was limited to injunctive relief. 3 Furthermore,
one federal circuit court held that a defendant's behavior is ac-
tionable only when it involves an intentionally discriminatory
act.1
4
2. Assistance to "Programs or Activities"
In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 5 the Supreme
Court held that Title IX applies only to the specific programs of
an institution that receive federal funding, not to the institu-
tion as a whole. The Court reached this conclusion after re-
viewing the language of the statute, 6 the legislative history 7
to the receipt of federal aid provided it does not dictate unconstitutional practices. See
Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103, 123 n.143 (1974)
(citing cases).
A history of the Title IX regulations is given in Comment, Title IX's Promise of
Equality of Opportunity in Athletics, supra, at 453-57.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
11. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
12. See id. at 706 n.41.
13. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1981).
14. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1981).
15. 456 U.S. 512, 537 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Title IX, § 902 (termination of funds shall be limited "in its effect to
the particular program;" each federal agency which is empowered to extend financial
assistance to an "educational program" is authorized to effectuate the provisions of
Title IX, § 901 by issuing regulations with respect to "such program or activity"). 20
U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
17. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh) ("[t he effect
COMM/ENT L. J.
and the construction given similar language in an analogous
statute.18 The Court, however, explicitly refused to define
"program" and remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine that matter.
Two years later, in Grove City College v. Bell,19 the Supreme
Court partially answered the question left open in North Ha-
ven and held that when an educational institution does not di-
rectly receive federal financial assistance, but its students
receive federal financial assistance, the only "program" receiv-
ing federal assistance under Title IX is the institution's finan-
cial aid program.20
The Court rejected, for two reasons, the argument that the
whole school is a "program" because the federal funds re-
ceived by the students ultimately free up the institution's own
resources to be used elsewhere.21 First, there was no factual
showing that the aid received by students resulted in the insti-
tution's funds being transferred to other areas within the insti-
tution.22 Second, even if such a transfer had been made most
financial assistance has economic ripple effects and it would be
very difficult, if not impossible, to determine the other areas
which are affected.23
A broad reading of the Grove City decision allows a private
educational institution to discriminate in athletics on the basis
of sex as long as its athletic department does not directly re-
ceive federal financial assistance (a rather common occur-
rence)24 and there is no state law to the contrary. However,
there is important language in Grove City which indicates that
the ruling may be given a narrower focus. The Court held that
student financial aid programs are sui generis and are not
analogous to non-earmarked financial aid to educational insti-
of termination of funds is limited to the particular entity and program in which such
noncompliance has been found").
18. See Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding
that Title VI, §§ 601-602 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1 (1976), which are virtu-
ally identical to Title IX, §§ 901-902, are program-specific).
19. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
20. Id. at 1221-22.
21. Id. at 1221.
22. Id.
23. Id. It is not clear why the Court dealt with these arguments as questions of
law, rather than as questions of fact to be decided by the trial court.
24. Wermiel, Justices Limit U.S. in Curtailing School Sex Bias, Wall St. J., Feb. 29,
1984, at 4, col. 1.
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tutions.25 Therefore, the Court's opinion does not address
whether an institution or an athletic program, which receives
federal financial aid other than aid directly received by its stu-
dents, converts the institution or the athletic program into a
"program" covered by Title IX.26 Accordingly, where the fed-
eral government pays the wages of employees of an institu-
tion's athletic program through the federally funded college
work-study program and the athletic program uses buildings
financed with federal funds, Title IX may indeed apply to the
athletic program."
3. Proscribed Discrimination
Although Title IX is a broadly worded statute which, with
the exception of certain specially stated activities, appears to
outlaw all sexual discrimination in programs receiving federal
financial assistance, the regulations promulgated under that
statute allow discrimination in two instances. First, in contact
sports a school can sponsor a team which only allows members
of one sex to participate.28 Second, in noncontact sports, if a
school sponsors a team for members of one sex and fails to
sponsor a team in that sport for members of the excluded sex,
the school must allow members of the excluded sex to try out
for the one team offered, if athletic opportunities for members
of the excluded sex have previously been limited.29
There is some question whether the Title IX regulations
which allow schools to prohibit one sex, usually females, from
participating in contact sports on a team composed solely of
members of the other sex are constitutional. In Yellow Springs
Exempted Village School District Board of Education v. Ohio
25. 104 S. Ct. at 1221.
26. Id. at 1232 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 532, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afd, 688 F.2d 14
(3d Cir. 1982).
28. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1983). The Title IX regulations classify boxing, wrestling,
rugby, ice hockey, football and basketball as contact sports, but they do not exclude
others. The regulations define contact sports as those "the purpose of [sic] major ac-
tivity of which involves bodily contact." Id.
Courts have reached different conclusions regarding whether baseball is a contact
sport. Compare Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp.
569, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (suggesting that baseball is not a contact sport) with Magill
v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (finding that
baseball is a contact sport), vacated on other grounds, 497 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1974).
29. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1983).
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High School Athletic Association,3° the district court held that
those regulations unconstitutionally violated female athletes'
liberty without due process of law: female athletes must be
given the opportunity to compete on male teams, even in con-
tact sports. Although this ruling was later reversed by the
Sixth Circuit, the reversal was not on the merits.3 '
The meaning of the phrase "athletic opportunities ...
[which] have previously been limited" in the Title IX regula-
tions 32 is unclear. It could refer to opportunities in that one
sport at that one school, overall athletic opportunities at that
one school, or overall athletic opportunities in general. The
courts have reached different conclusions.3
D. State Statutes and Regulations
Some states have passed legislation which allows females to
participate on male athletic teams even when there is a female
team. 34 Other statutes allow teams to be restricted by sex if
the teams are provided with substantially equal budgets, ex-
clusive of revenues generated by that sport, and are treated in
30. 443 F. Supp. 753, 759 (S.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd on procedural grounds, 647 F.2d 651
(6th Cir. 1981); see also Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp.
1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (it is "doubtful" that any legitimate governmental objective
justifies providing boys with the opportunity to participate in varsity interscholastic
competition in contact sports while denying absolutely the same opportunity to girls).
31. The ruling was reversed because: (1) neither party argued this issue; (2) no
evidence was offered on this point; and (3) the federal department which promulgated
the rule was not made a party. See 647 F.2d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1981); see also id. at 669
(Jones, J., dissenting).
32. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1983).
33. Compare Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659
(D.R.I. 1979) (phrase applies to that specific sport at that specific school), vacated, 604
F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979) with Mularadelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248,
427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980) (phrase applies to overall athletic opportunities at that specific
school).
34. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 340.379(2) (West 1976); see also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17:276 (West Supp. 1976) (allows sexually segregated teams in contact sports,
but disallows them in noncontact sports); Regulations of the Commissioner of Educa-
tion of New York § 135.4.
Some state statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in "public accommodations" have
been construed to apply to private organizations. See Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 52 U.S.L.W. 5076 (July 3, 1984). But see Martin v. International Olympic
Comm., No. 84-5859 (9th Cir. June 21, 1984) (state statute prohibiting sex discrimina-
tion does not require Olympic Committee to create new events for women); Isbister v.
Boys' Clubs, 144 Cal. App. 3d 338, 192 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1983) (fraternal organiza-
tions such as boys' clubs can exclude females from participating in their athletic
events because state nondiscrimination statutes only apply to "business
establishments").
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a substantially equal manner,35 or if the opportunity to partici-
pate on teams is substantially equal for both sexes. 36
Some state statutes prohibit sex discrimination in educa-
tional or recreational programs receiving state aid in language




Female athletes have repeatedly challenged rules barring
them from participation in "male" athletic events. 39 These
challenges have centered around the different treatment of wo-
men in contact and noncontact sports and have focused on
whether or not the male team was the only team sponsored by
the school.40
A. No Female Team
Female athletes who were barred from participating on the
male team when there was no female team have been rela-
tively successful in challenging the rules effecting such a bar.
Indeed, in recent years, with only one exception,4' the courts
have allowed females to participate on the male team when
there was no female team.42
The amateur athletic provisions banning female participa-
tion on a male team derive from six rationales. The courts and
commentators, however, have usually found these proffered
justifications lacking.
35. See MINN. STAT. § 126.21(3) (3) (Supp. 1982); see also ALASKA STAT. § 14.18.040
(Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.85.020(3) (Supp. 1981).
36. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-13-22 (1982).
37. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 296-61 (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.135 (West Supp.
1981); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41 (West Supp. 1978).
38. See MiNN. STAT. § 126.21(3) (Supp. 1982).
39. See cases cited infra notes 41-42, 64-72, 79, 84, 92, 103, 106-07.
40. See id.
41. Lafler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (boxing).
42. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975);
Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Force v. Pierce City
R-VI School Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp.
164 (D. Colo. 1977); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp.
1233 (D. Kan. 1974); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 358 (D. Neb.
1972); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334
A.2d 839 (1975).
COMM/ENT L. J.
1. The Six Rationales
The first rationale is that females in general are incapable of
competing with men in interscholastic athletics. However, as
some courts have noted, coordination, concentration, agility,
timing and technique contribute as much to athletic prowess
as size, especially in noncontact sports, and these factors are
not a function of gender.4 3 Even if females were less athleti-
cally talented, high school and college athletic programs which
are part of an educational experience have, at least theoreti-
cally, goals other than performance. It can be argued that the
educational benefits an individual gains by athletic participa-
tion are more important than the team's ultimate perform-
ance." Therefore, it is irrelevant whether females can compete
on the same level as males.4
The second justification for the exclusion of females is that
female participation would have an adverse effect on the future
development of female teams. This argument has been labeled
"too speculative to have merit. '46 Where there is no female
team in a particular sport, prohibiting female athletes from
participating on the male team cannot logically improve the
quality of the nonexistent female team. Further, it will not
necessarily increase the talent on other female teams that in-
volve a different sport since there is no assurance that female
athletes excluded from the male team will participate on the
other teams or that their talents are transferable. In short, the
43. See Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d at 1300; Hoover v.
Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. at 169 ("[a]ny notion that young women are so inherently
weak, delicate or physically inadequate that the state must protect them from the folly
of participation in vigorous athletics is a cultural anachronism unrelated to reality").
But see Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983) ("due to average physiological differences, males would
displace females to a substantial extent if they were allowed to compete for positions
on the volleyball team").
Moreover, this rationale for exclusion is without merit where schools had a "no-cut"
policy which allowed all males, no matter how untalented, to participate. See Brenden
v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d at 1300; Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc.,
514 F.2d at 350.
44. See Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 34, 46 &
n.80 (1977). See generally Lemaire, Women and Athletics: Toward a Physicality Per-
spective, 5 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 122, 134 (1982).
45. See Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa.
Commw. at 52, 334 A.2d at 843 (even if females as a class are less athletically skilled,
sex is an impermissible classification under the Pennsylvania constitution).
46. See Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d at 1302; Gilpin v. Kansas
State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. at 1243.
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state is placing an unjustifiable burden on the female athlete
by only permitting her to participate in another sport or not at
all. There is no similar Hobson's choice for male athletes.
47
The third rationale is that there is a greater risk of injury to
females who play on male teams. No empirical evidence has
ever been introduced to prove the greater risk of injury.41 Addi-
tionally, a blanket prohibition of female participation is both
overbroad and underinclusive since it bars females whose
physical fitness would make their risk of injury less likely but
allows injury-prone males to participate. 49 Nonetheless, in
light of the relatively limited experience of allowing females to
participate on male teams, this is an area where further empiri-
cal studies may be useful in proving or disproving the accuracy
of this rationale for exclusion.
The fourth reason is related to financial savings. Some
school boards have asserted that allowing females to partici-
pate would increase their costs because: (1) there would have
to be separate dressing room supervision necessitating
coaches of each sex for each team;5 0 or (2) a separate, addi-
tional female team would have to be funded, thereby appar-
ently increasing the costs for coaching and sporting
equipment.5 The courts have rejected these reasons primarily
on the grounds that the marginal increase in costs incurred by
allowing females to participate was insignificant.52
The fifth ground is that there are limited future opportunities
for females to participate; after a certain age female participa-
tion in sports wanes and therefore it is reasonable to expend
financial resources solely on boys, who will use the training to
develop permanent skills. In National Organization for Wo-
men v. Little League Baseball, Inc., the court rejected this
47. See Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d at 1302; Carnes v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Gilpin v.
Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. at 1243.
48. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d at 350.
49. Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. at 571. See
Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. at 169.
50. Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. at 525, 289 N.E.2d at 500.
51. See Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. at 262-63.
52. See id.; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. at 525-26, 289
N.E.2d at 500 ("this increased expense, which would not appear to be substantial when
one considers the cost of administering the entire system of interscholastic athletics
... cannot be considered a justifiable reason for denying approximately one-half of
the ... students... the opportunity to participate").
53. 127 N.J. Super. 522, 537-38, 318 A.2d 33, 38-39 (1974).
COMM/ENT L. J.
reasoning and held that it was unreasonable to deprive girls
aged eight to twelve who wish to play little league baseball of
the only available means for enjoyment of this activity merely
because they may not play baseball in the future.
The final argument, which is based on psychological theo-
ries, has two prongs: (1) males would lose the challenge to win
and would be deprived of the full measure of their achieve-
ment if they competed against females; and (2) females would
be discouraged when they consistently lost to males or, in the
event they won, uncomfortable because of cultural stereotypes
of their roles. An empirical study performed on this topic,
researched 100 schools over six months and concluded that
these fears were unfounded.54
2. Title IX Regulations
The Title IX regulations allow a school to sponsor a team in a
particular sport for members of one sex, even if the school does
not sponsor a team in that sport for members of the opposite
sex, if the sport involved is a contact sport.5 In noncontact
sports, if a school sponsors a team for members of one sex and
fails to sponsor a team in that sport for members of the oppo-
site sex, the school must allow members of the excluded sex to
try out for the one team offered if athletic opportunities for
members of the excluded sex have previously been limited.5 6
Several commentators have noted that the justification for
treating contact sports differently than noncontact sports is
weak. 7 If the distinction between contact and noncontact
sports is based on the perceived greater injury rate to women
in contact sports, which it appears to have been, 8 the justifica-
54. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., DIV'N OF HEALTH, PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND
RECREATION, REPORT ON EXPERIMENT: GIRLS ON BOYS INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC
TEAMS 69 (1972).
55. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1983).
56. Id. The phrase "athletic opportunities ... [which] have previously been lim-
ited" is ambiguous. Compare Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F.
Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979) with Mularadelis v.
Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980), both of which are
discussed infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
57. See Note, Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics: An Examination of Ap-
plicable Legal Doctrine, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1134 (1982); Todd, supra note 9, at 118
(1974); Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 9, at 1269-70;
Cox, supra note 44, at 44 (statistics regarding relative size, weight and likelihood of
injury between the sexes are irrelevant because neither the average man nor the aver-
age woman could play many intercollegiate sports).
58. See Note, Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics, supra note 57, at 1134.
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tion is arbitrary because it incorrectly assumes that all females
have a higher injury rate than all males.59 Moreover, this sanc-
tioning of sex discrimination in post-secondary school athletics
appears to be overly paternalistic. Individual female athletes
are capable of making their own decisions whether to partici-
pate and risk injury on teams with both sexes or to forego in-
tercollegiate athletics.0
One commentator has argued that an irrebuttable presump-
tion analysis should be used to invalidate rules which prohibit
females from participating on a male team in a contact sport
for two major reasons.61 First, there are no administrative or
safety advantages which inure to the state in having an irrebut-
table presumption that females are unqualified in contact
sports. Individual objective determinations of a male's athletic
qualifications are made for each team; such determination
could also be made for females. Second, whatever interest the
state has in protecting females, it should have a similar inter-
est in protecting males.
At one time, the Supreme Court appeared to hold that the
irrebuttable presumption analysis was improper;62 neverthe-
less, this analysis was later used by the Court in another
case. 63 It has not been used in recent Supreme Court decisions,
which probably indicates that it is no longer the preferred ana-
lytical tool.
3. Noncontact Sports
The Indiana Supreme Court in Haas v. South Bend Commu-
nity School Corp. ," struck down a rule which barred girls from
participating on the boys' golf team when the school provided
no girls' golf team. It held that when only one program is spon-
sored, any purported justification for exclusion based on differ-
ences in athletic abilities is impermissible. Similarly,
59. Id.
60. See Cox, supra note 44, at 44 n.68.
61. See Note, Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine: Applied to State and Federal
Regulations Excluding Females from Contact Sports, 4 U. DAYTON L REv. 197, 204-05
(1979).
62. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).
63. See Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 45-46 (1975) (plural-
ity opinion).
64. 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972).
65. Id. at 526, 289 N.E.2d at 499. See also Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n,
341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972) (golf).
COMM/ENT L. J.
females have successfully challenged rules which barred their
participation in cross-country skiing and running,66 tennis, 67
track,68 baseball,6 9 and soccer 70 when there was no female team
offered in these sports.
It is clear that rules which prohibit female athletes from par-
ticipating on the male team when there is no female team so
severely curtail female athletic participation in that sport that
no court should uphold such rules in non-contact sports. Ac-
cordingly, it is not surprising that every decision in this area in
recent years has allowed the female athlete to participate on
the male team.71
4. Contact Sports
Several courts have ruled that females cannot be prohibited
from participating on the male team in contact sports. In
both Force v. Pierce City R-VI School District 73 and Darrin v.
Gould,74 the courts invalidated rules which barred high school
girls from participating on the only football teams their schools
sponsored, a male team. The Force and Darrin courts ruled
against the schools on three grounds. First, both courts re-
jected the schools' argument that this rule protected females
from being injured, finding such putative concern for one sex
inappropriate where injury-prone boys were allowed to partici-
pate.78 This is precisely the type of sex discrimination which
has been struck down as unconstitutional since it perpetrates
stereotypical notions regarding the proper roles for women.76
66. See Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
67. See Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (striking
down rule prohibiting females from participating on male teams in all noncontact
sports); Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
68. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Gilpin v.
Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973).
69. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975); Carnes v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
70. Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
71. See supra notes 64-70.
72. See Force v. Pierce City R-VI School Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983);
Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978);
Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
73. 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
74. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
75. Force v. Pierce City R-VI School Dist., 570 F. Supp. at 1028-29; Darrin v. Gould,
85 Wash. 2d at 876, 540 P.2d at 892. Moreover, there were no significant risks of injury to
the female body; the lower court in Darrin found that the breasts could be adequately
protected and there was no substantial risk to the procreative organs. Id.
76. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality opinion)
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Second, one school argued that the rule threatened future
female participation in athletics. It theorized that if females
could play football on the male team, then males would have to
be allowed to play on the female volleyball team, and since
males are, on the average, better athletes, they would domi-
nate the volleyball team and female athletic participation
would decline. The Force court rejected this analysis by noting
that there was no evidence that males even wanted to play on
the female volleyball team, and if males ever did threaten to
dominate that sport, a separate female team could be organ-
ized.7 Third, the argument that "the average female" did not
have the ability to play football was flatly dismissed as being
irrelevant; the court held that the only relevant issue was the
ability of the one individual who wished to participate.78
In Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association,79
the court also held that when a school sponsors only one team,
members of either sex must be allowed to participate. The
court struck down an association rule which barred all forms of
interscholastic athletics between members of both sexes.80 It
rejected the athletic association's claim that the rule was justi-
fied by the increased risk of injury to girls because of differ-
ences in anatomy and physiology. 81 The court held that even if
there were a greater risk of injury-a contention which was not
proved-a total ban on female participation is not fairly or sub-
stantially related to a justifiable governmental objective.82 The
Leffel court noted, however, that equal protection does not
necessarily require that females be allowed to play on the male
team; other alternatives available to the school were to drop all
programs in that sport or to establish separate teams for each
gender.83
However, when the practical requirements of female partici-
pation would significantly alter the rules of the sport, it is more
("[I1f the . . . objective is to . . . protect' members of one gender because they are
presumed ... to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.").
77. See Force v. Pierce City R-VI School Dist., 570 F. Supp. at 1026-27.
78. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d at 876, 540 P.2d at 892.
79. 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
80. The challenged provision read: "The Board of Control shall prohibit all types
of interscholastic activity involving boys and girls competing with or against each
other except (a) as prescribed by state and federal law and (b) as determined by
Board of Control interpretations of such law." Id. at 1120.




likely that females will not be allowed to participate. In Lafler
v. Athletic Board of Control,84 the court did not issue a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting the sponsors of the Golden Gloves
boxing tournament from disqualifying a female entrant, even
though there was no other competition available to her. The
court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary
injunction because, among other things, she failed to prove:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and (2) ir-
reparable injury if she was not allowed to compete in the box-
ing tournament. The court ruled that the plaintiff probably
would not succeed at trial because the physical differences be-
tween the sexes justified the boxing prohibition against female
entrants.85 The female boxer wore a protective covering for her
breasts which apparently violated a boxing rule against such
clothing.86 In essence, the court ruled that the female's exclu-
sion was permissible because the only socially acceptable form
of her participation, a protective covering for her breasts,
would change the rules of the sport.87
The Lafler court further held that since boxing is a danger-
ous sport under the best of circumstances, it would be irre-
sponsible to allow Ms. Lafler and other women to box against
men without "consideration of all of the factors involved,"88 an
ambiguous phrase presumably meaning that a trial on the mer-
its was required. This portion of the court's reasoning may be
overly paternalistic. The female athlete was nineteen years
old, old enough to make her own choice regarding the dangers
of competition.
Finally, the court held that the plaintiff failed to show how
she was irreparably harmed. The court explained that even if
84. 536 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
85. The court also held that the amateur boxing organizations which prohibited
female boxers probably did not involve state action, Id. at 105-06. This conclusion
appears even more supportable after several recent Supreme Court decisions in this
area. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982). See also McDonald v. New Palestine Youth Baseball League, Inc., 561 F. Supp.
1167 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (the fourteenth amendment does not apply to a private baseball
league).
86. 536 F. Supp. at 106. The court also noted that the rules require the contestants
to wear a protective cup, an unnecessary requirement for females. Id. Since this is
purely a safety rule, it is difficult to see why a female's refusal of this "protection"
would detrimentally affect the sport.
87. Id. at 107. This may not be an insurmountable obstacle. At least one state
athletic commission (California) has allowed women boxers to fight men boxers. See
L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1982, pt. III, at 2, col. 1.
88. 536 F. Supp. at 107.
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she ultimately succeeded on the merits, it could order: (1) the
implementation of a women's competition or (2) her participa-
tion in the next annual Golden Gloves tournament.89 Both of
these arguments are based on the assumption that the timing
of the competition is immaterial, i.e., participation in a tourna-
ment next year would be just as valuable as participation in
this year's tournament. The accuracy of this assumption is
questionable since an athlete's amateur "career" is usually rel-
atively short and it would be impossible to compensate, in
money or otherwise, for the lost opportunity of competing in a
major event which occurs only once a year. 0
B. An Available Female Team
Several courts have stated in dicta that a female precluded
from participating on the male team is not denied equal protec-
tion if there is a comparable female team.91 The factual predi-
cate necessary to reach that conclusion was analyzed in
O'Connor v. Board of Education,92 in which a very talented fe-
male junior high school basketball player wanted to play on
the male team even though a female basketball team existed.
The O'Connor court noted that the school's policy of offering
separate teams is based on a generalization about the relative
basketball skills of high school males and females. The evi-
dence presented to the court supported the validity of the gen-
eralization and the plaintiff produced no evidence that the
male and female teams were, in fact, treated unequally.93
89. Id. at 108.
90. See also Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1159-60 (D. Mass. 1973); The ABC
League v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n, 530 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (E.D. Mo.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, In re United States ex rel. Missouri State High School
Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982); Cooper v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n,
52 Or. App. 425, 442, 629 P.2d 386, 396 (1981) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
91. See Ruman v. Eskew, 168 Ind. App. 428, 431, 343 N.E.2d 806, 809-10 (1976); Leffel
v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
92. 545 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The case had a complicated history. After the
complaint was filed, the district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the
school board to allow the plaintiff to try out for the male team. Id. at 384-387. The
district court denied defendant's motion to stay this ruling pending appeal. A divided
panel of the Seventh Circuit granted the stay, but did not state its reasons. See id. at
378. The Seventh Circuit en banc, also in a divided vote, continued the stay. See id.
Plaintiff unsuccessfully applied to Justice Stevens to vacate the stay. O'Connor v.
Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (1980). The Seventh Circuit then reversed entry of the
preliminary injunction. O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
93. The court noted that the female athlete failed to challenge the association's
position that the male and female teams were equal in funding, facilities and other
COMM/ENT L. J.
The court also noted that the policy of separate teams for
each sex was designed to maximize the participation of both
sexes in interscholastic sports.94 It reasoned that since males,
on the whole, are substantially better basketball players than
are females, there would be a substantial risk, absent a gender-
based classification, that males would dominate the females'
program.95 Plaintiff conceded that the policy of separate teams
substantially related to the goal of maximum overall
participation.96
Plaintiff's failure to challenge the putative equality of the
two teams and her concession that separate teams maximized
the participation of both sexes doomed the plaintiff's position.
First, when a classification is reasonable in substantially all of
its applications, it is not unconstitutional because it appears
arbitrary in an individual case. By failing to introduce evi-
dence that the female team was not equal to the male team, the
plaintiff committed a fatal error; if the teams are equal, there is
no harm in having female athletes play on the female team.
There is, however, a serious question whether separate fe-
male teams can ever be equal to male teams. Even if the
teams, viewed objectively, are equal, the male team may be
perceived to be more prestigious. If so, the talented female
athlete may legitimately feel she should be entitled to play on
the more prestigious team.9 8
Second, it is not obvious why the plaintiff conceded that sep-
arate teams benefitted the females' program. Allowing tal-
ented females to participate on the male team does not
necessarily mean that males could, or should, participate on
the female team.9 9 It is possible to have one team open to
members of both sexes and another team composed only of fe-
objective criteria. Further, there is no mention that the female athlete challenged the
rule on nonobjective factors. 545 F. Supp. at 379 n.4.
94. Id. at 379.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d at 581; 545 F. Supp. at 381.
98. See generally Kirstein v. Rector's and Visitors, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970)
(all-male school possessed unequalled prestige and therefore other institutions were
not equal); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (intangible factors such as reputation
must be considered in determining whether schools are equal).
99. Cf. Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D. Ind. 1979) ("there is nothing
inherently fair about symmetry" if the parties are not similarly situated), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980).
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males.100 If males are not allowed to play on the female team,
they could not dominate it and the reason for banning females
from the male team vanishes.
The O'Connor court also rejected the athlete's claim that her
Title IX rights were violated because her exclusion from the
male team did not effectively accommodate her interests and
abilities. 1'0 The court noted that the Title IX regulation that
was allegedly violated, 10 2 regarding the accommodation of in-
terests and abilities of the athletes, only requires educational
institutions to make that accommodation when deciding which
sports to offer; providing separate but equal teams is a method
which the regulations clearly state is acceptable.
However, other courts have held that providing a separate
female team is not sufficient. In Commonwealth v. Penn-
sylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association,°3 the state court
ruled that an association rule barring females from participat-
ing on male teams in both noncontact and contact sports was
unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amend-
ment even when there is a female team in that sport.'0 4 The
court reasoned that it was impermissible to deny a female "the
right to play at the level of competition which [her] ability
might otherwise permit."'' 0 Such reasoning probably indicates
the court's belief that the level of competition on the female
team was not equal to that on the male team, although it also
seems to disclose the court's sub rosa holding that separate is
inherently unequal in sex classifications, as well as in race
classifications. This decision effectively supplanted a federal
court decision in Pennsylvania, Ritacco v. Norwin School Dis-
trict,'0 6 which was handed down only months before the com-
plaint in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth case was filed and
which held that separate teams were acceptable. Several other
cases in this area which were decided before the mid-1970's are
now questionable as precedent because of the heightened
100. See MINN. STAT. § 126.21(3) (4) (Supp. 1982); Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n Pol-
icy Resolution (Oct. 19, 1981) (limited to noncontact sports), cited in Clark v. Arizona
Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1127 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983).
101. 545 F. Supp. at 383.
102. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)(1) (1983).
103. 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
104. Id. at 49, 334 A.2d at 843; see also Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d at 870, 540 P.2d at
893 (1975).
105. 18 Pa. Commw. at 48, 334 A.2d at 842.
106. 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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scrutiny now given to sex-based classifications. °7
One state allows sexually segregated wrestling teams as long
as members of each sex who have a demonstrated interest in
wrestling are provided programs or events which accommo-
date that interest. 10 8
IV
Excluded Males
Recently some schools have sponsored interscholastic sports
which are available only to female participants. Not surpris-
ingly, males who were excluded from participating in those
programs have challenged their exclusion under federal and
state statutes and constitutions. 10 9
A. Title IX
In Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 10 the
court preliminarily enjoined a school from barring a male ath-
lete from participation on a female volleyball team when there
was no male volleyball team. It held that Title IX allowed a
107. See, e.g., Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(ruling that female swimmers were not deprived of their equal protection rights even
though (1) they were barred from swimming on the male team, and (2) there were
different nonathletic restrictions on the female team).
This case is now questionable authority for two reasons. First, it did not give a
heightened scrutiny to this sex-based classification; it used the out-dated test of
whether the rule was rational. Second, it implied that a different result might occur if
there was legislative action. The subsequent passage of Title IX certainly appears to
qualify as a legislative response.
Several other older cases are now also unpersuasive as precedent for similar rea-
sons. See, e.g., Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., Civ.
No. 12-49-27 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1971) (discussed in Comment, Sex Discrimina-
tion in Interscholastic High School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 535, 543 (1974)); Gre-
gorio v. Board of Educ., No. C-198869 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 1971), affid, No. A-127770
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 5, 1971) (discussed in Note, The Case for Equality in
Athletics, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 570, 577 (1973)).
108. See MINN. STAT. § 126.21(3) (5) (Supp. 1982); See also Comment, Sex Discrimi-
nation in Interscholastic High School Athletics, supra note 107, at 566 n.185 (state could
prohibit some coeducational sports, e.g., wrestling, on the basis of the state's power to
police morals).
109. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp.
659 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979); Petrie v. Illinois High School
Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 885 (1979); Attorney General v. Massachusetts In-
terscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979); Mularadelis v.
Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980); Forte v. Board of
Educ., 105 Misc. 2d 36, 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
110. 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
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school to have one team in a sport which was composed solely
of members of one sex only when there had been, and presum-
ably continues to be, adequate opportunities for participation
in that sport for members of the excluded sex."' Therefore,
even though over-all athletic opportunities for males were not
limited, because their opportunities were limited in some
sports, including volleyball,"2 this male volleyball player was
allowed to play on the female team.
The First Circuit stayed implementation of this preliminary
injunction because its issuance would have disrupted the re-
mainder of the volleyball season and because, the court stated,
the defendants would probably have succeeded on the mer-
its." 3 However, the court did not explicate its reasoning re-
garding the merits of the litigation. The appellate court later
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case
for dismissal as moot since the season was over and the plain-
tiff was about to graduate." 4 Neither the trial court opinion nor
the appellate court stay in Gomes should be heavily relied on.
The trial court opinion, although providing a reasoned analysis
of the problem, was stayed in part on the merits and the appel-
late court stay order provided no explanation of its reasoning
regarding the merits of the litigation.
In Mularadelis v. Haldane Central School Board,"1 the court
upheld a school board's refusal to allow a male high school stu-
dent to participate on the female tennis team, the only team
the school sponsored in that sport. The court construed the
relevant language in the Title IX regulations to mean that
males can be barred from participating on the female team,
even if the female team is the only school team in that sport, as
111. 469 F. Supp. at 665. This interpretation does not necessarily follow from the
wording of the regulation. Indeed, in a footnote the court hinted that it might be un-
necessary. It reasoned:
Perhaps, in a sport long dominated by males, a school could even create only a
female team without making any provisions for male participation; such a hy-
pothetical situation might be constitutionally permissible because Congress
could find that sufficient athletic opportunities existed in the private sector for
males to play the particular sport.
Id. at 665 n.3.
112. Id. at 664. The court felt this interpretation was compelled by the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. Id. at 664-65.
113. 604 F.2d 733, 735 (1st. Cir. 1979). The court gave no reason for its conclusion
regarding which party would probably succeed on merits of the litigation. The
Supreme Court refused to vacate the stay. 441 U.S. 958 (1979).
114. 604 F.2d at 736.
115. 74 A.D.2d 248, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980).
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long as over-all athletic opportunities for males at that school
have not been limited."6 In this case, since there were almost
twice the number of male teams as female teams, opportuni-
ties for males were not limited," 7 and the prohibition against
male athletes on the female team was upheld.
The Mularadelis court's interpretation of the Title IX regula-
tions was grounded on the following two-step analysis. First,
the initial substantive sentence in this section of the regula-
tions restricts its applicability to situations "where a recipient
... sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one
sex [but fails to sponsor a team for members of the excluded
sex]."l"8 Second, the criterion for determining whether mem-
bers of the excluded sex can participate depends on the broad,
general language of whether "athletic opportunities for mem-
bers of [the excluded] sex have previously been limited."119
The court concluded that had Congress intended the limitation
to refer only to a particular sport, it would have chosen words
with that more limited meaning.120 Notwithstanding the Mu-
laradelis court's analysis, Congress cannot be blamed for the
ambiguity; these regulations were drafted by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare.
The Mularadelis court's analysis can be criticized in three
areas. First, an interpretation which is not tied to the particu-
lar sport at issue will, in virtually all cases, result in a complete
bar of the male athlete's participation in that sport. It is self-
evident that males have traditionally had greater athletic op-
portunities at school. However, it seems fundamentally unfair
to tell a male athlete that because female athletes were previ-
ously not allowed to play baseball or football, he cannot now
play tennis. Second, it is unlikely that males will dominate the
female team. Indeed, in none of the reported cases 12 1 were
males in general, or the particular male plaintiff, dominating
the female team. Further, it is not necessarily true that males
116. Id. at 253, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 463. See also Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. at
170; Cox, supra note 44, at 50.
117. 74 A.D.2d at 253, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
118. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1983) (emphasis added)).
119. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1983) (emphasis added)).
120. Id. at 253, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
121. See Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I.
1979), vacated, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979); Attorney General v. Massachusetts Inter-
scholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979); Mularadelis v. Haldane
Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980).
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are better athletes than females. 122 Third, if the number or
quality of male athletes does in fact dominate the female team,
the school should sponsor a male team. The Title IX regula-
tions require that a school's selection of sports and levels of
competition must accommodate the interests and abilities of
members of both sexes. 123 A total ban on male participation
would represent the state's maximum intrusion in this area
and is a result which should be avoided if possible.
A third possible interpretation of this section of the Title IX
regulations, an interpretation ignored by both the Gomes and
Mularadelis courts, is that it refers to athletic opportunities in
general, and is not limited to the opportunities available at the
recipient school. Under this interpretation, the phrase "ath-
letic opportunities for members of [the excluded sex which
were previously limited]" would be referring to the female ex-
perience in general.
B. State Statutes
In Forte v. Board of Education 124 the court upheld an athletic
association's policy which barred males from participating on
the female interscholastic power volleyball team. It ruled that
this policy did not violate either a state statute regarding dis-
crimination in sports'25 or the regulations promulgated there-
under.'26 The athlete failed to challenge the policy on the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause or Title IX.
122. Although "males as a class tend to have an advantage in strength and speed
over females as a class, the range of differences among individuals in both sexes is
greater than the average differences between the sexes." Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.
Supp. at 166. See also LeMaire, supra note 44, at 126. Although men in general have
larger muscle mass, [a] higher proportion of lean body tissue, greater cardio-
vascular capacity, and greater height, [women in general] have an edge in
sports that test balance, since their average lower center of gravity augments
stability. They retain heat longer and enjoy greater buoyancy than men-both
advantages in swimming .... There is also evidence of higher endurance
levels, and lower injury rates, for females.
Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass, at 358 &
n.34, 393 N.E.2d at 293 & n.34.
123. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)(1) (1983).
124. 105 Misc. 2d 36, 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
125. "No person shall be disqualified from state public and high school athletic
teams, by reason of that person's sex, except pursuant to regulations promulgated by
the state commissioner of education." N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3201-A (McKinney 1981).
126. Section 135.4(c) (7) (ii) (c) of the regulations of the Commissioner of Education.
The regulations seemingly require a decision by a review panel to determine whether
a member of one sex can play on a team otherwise composed of members of the other
sex.
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Therefore, the court's ruling was appropriately limited to an in-
terpretation of state law.
One state statute, consistent with Title IX regulations, al-
lows membership on a team to be restricted to members of one
sex if overall athletic opportunities for that sex have previ-
ously been limited.'27 Accordingly, challenges to state provi-
sions such as this one can be based upon (1) state
constitutional equal protection guaranties,'2 8 (2) the
supremacy clause'29 if Title IX is applicable and the Title IX
regulations are held to be beyond the scope of the Title IX stat-
ute, and (3) the federal constitution's equal protection
clause. 130
C. State and Federal Constitutions
In Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic
Association,'3 ' the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
struck down an athletic association's blanket rule that "[nIo
boy may play on a girls' team. "132 This rule was applied to pro-
hibit males from participating on female volleyball and field
hockey teams, although there were no male teams offered in
those sports. The court rejected the association's three at-
tempts to justify the rule. First, it held that gender, standing
alone, is so imperfect as a measuring tool for athletic ability
that it cannot be used as a "proxy."'133 There are obvious bio-
logical differences between the sexes. However, coordination,
concentration, strategic acumen and technique are capabilities
of both sexes, and those qualities intermix with strength and
speed, where males as a class have an advantage.3 Therefore,
unless there are references to actual skill differentials in par-
ticular sports, the prohibition of male athletes on female teams
cannot stand. 35
Second, the court held that the rule does not legitimately
promote the safety of females. A female is no less exposed to
injury as a member of a male team, than as a member of a fe-
127. See MINN. STAT. § 126.21(3) (Supp. 1982).
128. See, e.g., MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1.
129. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979).
132. Id. at 346-47, 393 N.E.2d at 287.
133. Id. at 357, 393 N.E.2d at 293.
134. Id. at 358, 393 N.E.2d at 293.
135. Id.
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male team with some male players. 136 Additionally, the associ-
ation offered no evidence that females would suffer greater
injuries when playing on a team with male members than
when playing on a team without them.137
Third, the court concluded that the rule cannot be justified
because it allegedly protects female participation in sports. 38
In light of the fact that there was no evidence to support this
rationale, the court held that the total ban on male participa-
tion was too sweeping. 39 Further, even if this justification
were based in fact, it would not support a total bar on male
participation; less restrictive alternatives must be used. 4°
This analysis was substantially rejected in Clark v. Arizona
Interscholastic Association."' The Clark court held that an
athletic association's rule which precluded males from playing
on female interscholastic volleyball teams did not violate the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 1 The court
held that "redressing past discrimination against women in
athletics and promoting equality of athletic opportunity be-
tween the sexes" were important governmental objectives. 43
It further held that because of physiological differences be-
tween the sexes, males would displace females if they were al-
lowed to compete for positions on the same team.'" The court
concluded that the policy of excluding males was substantially
related to important governmental objectives and, therefore,
the association's rule did not offend the Constitution. 145
The Clark opinion focused on prior limited athletic opportu-
nities for females in general." The court did not analyze
whether opportunities in volleyball or in volleyball at this spe-
cific high school were limited. Indeed, the opinion does not
even mention whether female athletic opportunities in general
in Arizona were previously limited.
In Petrie v. Illinois High School Association ,14 the court up-
136. Id. at 359, 393 N.E.2d at 294.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 359, 393 N.E.2d at 294-95.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983).
142. 695 F.2d at 1131-32.




147. 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 855 (1979).
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held, over state and federal constitutional challenges, an asso-
ciation rule which barred a male athlete from playing on the
female volleyball team, even though there was no other school
team in this sport. It held that sex is a legitimate classifying
factor for athletic ability.'48 A system of measurement based
on height and strength (and presumably other characteristics
as well) would be too difficult to devise.149 Further, even if a
handicapping system could be devised, it would be undesirable
because it is too subjective to use in team sports, and would
"[place] a premium on prior poor performance and is inconsis-
tent with a system of full competition."' 50
The Petrie court also held that rules requiring exclusive fe-
male participation in a sport promote female participation in
athletics;' male participation on female teams would reduce
the total number of females who could participate. 2 The
court took judicial notice that many school districts are in a
difficult financial position and concluded that this placed a
practical limit on the number of additional teams a school
could sponsor. 53
Finally, the court held that because of past disparity of ath-
letic opportunity, innate physical differences, and the overlap-
ping of the female volleyball season with the football season,
boys and girls are not similarly situated. Therefore, a rule ex-
cluding all males from participating in a sport is an acceptable
form of affirmative action.1'
The affirmative action analysis of both the Clark and Petrie
courts seems flawed. The key issue in determining the legality
of affirmative action programs is whether the focus should be
on athletics in general or the particular sport from which males
are excluded. Clark and Petrie assumed, virtually without dis-
cussion, that the focus should be on athletics in general. 5
This assumption is highly questionable because the athletic
skills necessary for playing different sports vary markedly. It
is self-evident that the strength and agility necessary to foot-
ball linemen bear little similarity to the coordination and flexi-
148. Id. at 988-89, 394 N.E.2d at 862.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 989, 394 N.E.2d at 862.
152. Id. at 991-92, 394 N.E.2d at 864.
153. Id. at 989, 394 N.E.2d at 862.
154. Id. at 991-92, 394 N.E.2d at 864.
155. Id at 988-89, 394 N.E.2d at 862; 695 F.2d at 1130-31.
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bility required of a gymnast. Indeed, the athletic talents
required to succeed in different positions in the same team
sport vary significantly; many athletes are incapable of suc-
cessfully mastering more than one position in a team sport.
Therefore, an absolute prohibition of males from one school
program, e.g., volleyball, may effectively preclude male ath-
letes with talent in that sport from participating in any inter-
scholastic athletic competition.
Similarly, in employment discrimination cases, the courts
have not held that the proper test is whether there is discrimi-
nation in employment in general; rather, they have looked at
the specific type of job at issue.156 If the focus is on the particu-
lar sport, it is clear that the programs in Clark and Petrie are
unconstitutional for three reasons. First, there was no finding,
judicial or otherwise,'57 of past discrimination against females
in interscholastic volleyball in Arizona or Illinois. There must
be some determination of past discrimination to show that the
affirmative action program is legitimate. 5 8 Otherwise, new dis-
crimination could be countenanced in the guise of remedying
past discrimination. 59 Additionally, it is impossible to devise
an acceptable remedial program unless the extent of past dis-
crimination is known. 160
Second, those affirmative action programs unnecessarily
trammel the interests of males.' 6' The programs have the max-
imum intrusive effect on males since they absolutely ban male
participation in interscholastic volleyball. Further, the dis-
crimination against males in volleyball which was counte-
nanced in Clark will be perpetual since there was never an
interscholastic volleyball program available to them. No legal
affirmative action program should limit opportunities this
severely.
156. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (the
affirmative action program was limited to craft employees); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682
F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (limited to traffic officers); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th
Cir.) (limited to faculty), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
157. See, e.g., Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d at 508; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546
F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (judicial finding of past racial discrimination is not
a prerequisite to adopting an affirmative action program).
158. See, e.g., Valentine v. Smith 654 F.2d at 508; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546
F. Supp. at 1200.
159. Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d at 508.
160. Id.
161. Cf. id. at 510 ("cannot completely bar whites"); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't,
679 F.2d 541, 553 (6th Cir. 1982).
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Third, the affirmative action programs are of an indefinite du-
ration. A sine qua non of a legal affirmative action program is
that it endures only as long as reasonably necessary to achieve
its legitimate goals. 162 If it lasts longer than that, the program
creates its own pernicious discrimination. 163 The Arizona and
Illinois plans are of an infinite duration. There is no explicit
ending date164 or a mechanism for determining when the ef-
fects of past discrimination are remedied.'65 Therefore, by
their very terms, the plans are not substantially related to rem-
edying only past discrimination. This problem is exacerbated
because the turnover of high school athletes is virtually 100%
every four years. Therefore, once a school adopts a nondis-
criminatory program, the current effects of prior discrimina-
tion should quickly dissipate.
V
Game Rules
Some jurisdictions have used different game rules for male
and female athletic teams. For example, female basketball
rules sometimes allow more players and have additional re-
strictions on the offense in contrast to male basketball rules. 66
Similarly, some female volleyball teams play with a shorter net
than the male team. 67
In Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Associa-
tion,'68 a female athlete challenged the female basketball team
rules under the federal Constitution's equal protection clause.
She claimed that being deprived of the opportunity to play a
162. Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d at 510.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (preferential selec-
tion of craft trainees at one plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled
craft workers in that plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 543 F. Supp. 662, 681 (E.D. La. 1982).
166. See, e.g., Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795-
96 (6th Cir. 1977); Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 394, 396 (E.D. Ark.
1979); Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150, 152
(W.D. Okla. 1977). Apparently the only places where female basketball rules differ
from male rules are the public high schools in Iowa and Oklahoma. Comment, Half-
Court Girls'Basketball Rules: An Application of the Equal Protection Clause and Title
IX, 65 IowA L. REV. 766, 767 n.5 (1980). Different rules for female basketball were origi-
nally instituted to prevent "stars" from dominating the game and because more ag-
gressive play was not considered feminine. See LeMaire, supra note 44, at 129.
167. See Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 604 F.2d at 735 n.2.
168. 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977).
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full-court game or to follow traditional offensive rules would
make it virtually impossible for her to sufficiently hone her
skills to obtain a college athletic scholarship.'69 The court
noted that there are differences in physical characteristics and
capabilities between the sexes and therefore summarily con-
cluded that rules can be tailored to accommodate those
differences. 70
The Cape court made no attempt to tie its findings about the
physical differences between the sexes to the reasons for the
different female rules. Indeed, three of the proffered justifica-
tions for the rules were that (1) they provide a more interest-
ing game for the fans, (2) they ensure continued crowd support
because of the fans' familiarity with these rules, and (3) they
allow more students to participate.' 7' These have no connec-
tion with physical differences between the sexes. Additionally,
the other purported justification, the protection of weaker and
more awkward students, was seemingly based on a stereotypi-
cal view of female athletes. 72 Indeed, this becomes self-evi-
dent when it is noted that the only places in the United States
where the basketball rules still differ depending on sex are the
public high schools in two states. 73
In light of current equal protection analysis, 74 the opinion
seems flawed. None of those four justifications appears to be
an important governmental objective. Even if they were, one
could argue that the rules cannot be justified since they do not
closely relate to those objectives. The first two justifications
are not important governmental objectives which should sanc-
tion any type of sex discrimination. Indeed, most fans of fe-
male basketball are probably already cognizant of the rules of
male basketball and therefore will not have to learn new rules.
The third justification for disparate rules is totally unsupport-
able since there is no indication that fewer students will par-
ticipate if the female team follows the rules of the male team.
The final justification also bears no true relationship to the rea-
169. Id. at 794.
170. Id. at 795.
171. Id.
172. Id. See Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. at 166; Attorney General v. Massa-
chusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. at 358 & n.34, 393 N.E.2d at 293 & n.34
(1979).
173. Iowa and Oklahoma.
174. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. at 3334-36; Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979).
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sons for different rules. There is no evidence that the differ-
ences in the rules protect weaker or more awkward students
even if one makes the mistaken assumption that all females
are weak and awkward and, therefore, need protection.
Different basketball rules for females were also challenged
in Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Associa-
tion. 7 ' The Jones court rejected plaintiff's argument that the
female basketball rules denied her the full pleasure and physi-
cal development inherent in male basketball rules and that her
future basketball career was being impaired in violation of her
rights to equal protection of the law.'76 It held that such allega-
tions failed to state a substantial constitutional question.17
7
One other court expressed a similar view in dicta, i.e., that "[a]
federal court is no place to decide whether a particular sex
should be allowed to dribble the full length of a basketball
court or pitch underhand."'7 8
Nevertheless, in Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Associa-
tion, 79 the court held that the disparate rules between male
and female basketball violated the federal Constitution's equal
protection clause. It emphatically rejected the proposition that
there was any physiological or anatomical reason which pre-
cluded high school girls from successfully playing under the
boys' rules.180 Since it found that the only reason for the differ-
ent rules was tradition, it concluded that there was no impor-
tant governmental objective at stake and that the rule could
not pass constitutional muster.' 81 It also explicitly rejected the




In Striebel v. Minnesota State High School League,'183 plain-
tiffs alleged they were the victims of illegal sex discrimination
because the state high school association established different
175. 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
176. Id. at 155.
177. Id. at 156.
178. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. at 665 n.2.
179. 468 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
180. Id. at 397.
181. Id. at 398.
182. Id.
183. 321 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1982).
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seasons for boys and girls in tennis and swimming. The court
upheld this policy regarding different seasons because (1)
there was "uncontroverted" evidence that access to pools and
tennis courts was limited in many high schools and there was
no feasible way to accommodate both male and female teams
in the same season, 8 4 and (2) neither season in either sport is
substantially better than the other.185 It was unclear whether
the different season policy was tested under the Minnesota or
federal Constitution, or both.
Four justices dissented.'8 6 They argued that the majority
opinion was mistaken in both of its major findings. First, addi-
tional facilities could be obtained, e.g., by leasing them.187 Sec-
ond, the female tennis season, which occurs in the fall, is less
desirable than the male season because it begins before the
school year starts and may be cut short by early winter
weather.'88 Additionally, the dissenters argued that rigid sex-
defined teams have long-term detrimental effects on male-fe-
male relationships-a result to be avoided.
89
This case is notable because of the court's conclusory han-
dling of what are relatively objective facts. Certainly the
number of pools, tennis courts, teams and interscholastic
events can be determined with precision. Further, the availa-
bility and costs of leasing additional facilities can also be
shown with specificity. Nonetheless, none of those figures
were explicitly analyzed in either the majority or dissenting
opinions.
Although a trial court's factual findings generally should be
upheld unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, 190 some
analysis must be made to determine whether the findings are
merited. Under one view, only "historical," not "legislative,"
facts are tested under the clearly erroneous rule.'9 ' Legislative
facts are those general considerations that move a rule-making
body to adopt a rule, as distinguished from the facts which de-
184. Id. at 402.
185. Id.
186. Justices Wahl, Todd, Yetka and Scott.
187. 321 N.W.2d at 404 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
188. Id. There was no discussion regarding whether the girls' swimming season was
less desirable than the boys' swimming season.
189. Id.
190. 48 MiNN. STAT. ANN., R. Civ. PRoc. 52.01 (West 1981).
19]. Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 801 (1983).
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termine whether the rule was correctly applied.'92 Facts which
go to the reasonableness of a rule are examples of legislative
facts 193 and therefore the different seasons rule would fall in
this category. Accordingly, under this view, the clearly errone-
ous standard would have been inapplicable, and the factual




The courts are still in the process of determining the appro-
priate principles of law to test the legality of different forms of
sex discrimination in amateur athletics. Nevertheless, it can
now be stated with some certainty that amateur athletic rules
excluding females from the only team available, a male team,
are invalid in noncontact sports, and probably invalid in con-
tact sports. 94 There are two possible exceptions: (1) when fe-
male participation would necessarily alter the rules of the
sport; 95 and (2) when there is a comparable female team.196
As discussed earlier however, it will be rare to find comparable
teams.
In contrast, several recent cases have held that males can be
excluded from the only team available, a female team, because
of the affirmative action goal of maximizing current female par-
ticipation.'97  These decisions are questionable since they
failed to focus on the particular sport involved and instead,
considered athletics in general. The decisions also failed to an-
alyze the extent of prior athletic discrimination against fe-
males or consider that the programs did not have a set
termination date for their affirmative action.
Most female athletes who have challenged the legality of
having to play a sport under different rules than males have
been unsuccessful.198 However, given that the rules governing
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Force v. Pierce City R-VI School Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo.
1983) and cases cited supra note 72.
195. See Lafler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
196. See O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 545 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
197. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983) and cases cited supra note 109.
198. See, e.g., Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793 (6th
Cir. 1977) and cases cited supra note 166.
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the female version of a sport were based on incorrect, stere-
otypical notions of male-female athletic ability, and that there
was no demonstrated important governmental objective in up-
holding them, the rules should have been declared invalid.
One recent decision held that there can be different male
and female seasons for certain sports when neither season is
substantially better than the other and no practicable way ex-
ists to accommodate both male and female teams in the same
season.199 Although this legal proposition may appear sound,
the decision is flawed because the court failed to consider
whether there was a feasible way to accommodate both teams
in one season.
As the preceding analysis has illustrated, many of the recent
decisions regarding sex discrimination in amateur athletics
have failed adequately to analyze the problems involved. For
this reason, these decisions should not be blindly followed.
199. See Streibel v. Minnesota State High School League, 321 N.W.2d 400 (Minn.
Sup. Ct. 1982).

